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Abstract. In this paper we propose the notion of “subjective reference” as a con-
ceptual tool that explains how and why human-robot sexual interactions could 
reframe users approach to human-human sexual interactions. First, we introduce 
the current debate about Sexual Robotics, situated in the wider discussion about 
Social Robots, stating the urgency of a regulative framework. We underline the 
importance of a social-relational approach, mostly concerned about Social Ro-
bots impact in human social structures. Then, we point out the absence of a pre-
cise framework conceptualizing why Social Robots, and Sexual Robots in partic-
ular, may modify users’ sociality and relationality. Within a psychological frame-
work, we propose to consider Sexual Robots as “subjective references”, namely 
objects symbolically referring to human subjects: we claim that, for the user ex-
perience, every action performed upon a Sexual Robot is symbolically directed 
toward a human subject, including degrading and violent practices. This shifting 
mechanism may transfer the user relational setting from human-robot interactions 
to human-human interactions. 
Keywords: Social Robots, Ethics of Technology, Psychology of HCI, Human-
Robot Interactions. 
1 Different Approaches to the Regulative Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Sexual Robots (SRs), today mainly with a female aspect, aims to reproduce as believ-
ably as possible a human sexual interaction (Sullins 2012), to satisfy users’ sexual de-
sires. These machines will not perform their sexual functions only from a physical-
mechanical point of view (Scheutz 2011). In fact, for this type of necessity, countless 
types of objects are already marketed, thought to increase the physical possibility of 
enjoying pleasure. On the contrary, SRs won’t mimic only the physical aspects of sex-
ual intercourse, but also the relational and emotional ones.  
There already are some examples of Sexual Robots on the market, although they are 
in an early stage (Danaher 2017). These robots can interact physically and verbally with 
the user, using a predefined set of behaviors (Bendel 2016). One of the most interesting 
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technologies today on the market is Roxxxy, a full-size interactive sexual gynoid. 
Roxxxy has a human-like skin, a good physical resemblance of a real woman and, most 
important, it interacts verbally adapting her personality to user communicative feed-
backs.  
The site marketing Roxxxy, True Companion, promise that Roxxxy(s): 
 
“Can hear what you say, speak, feel your touch, move their bodies, are mobile and 
have emotions and a personality. Additional personalities may be taught to the robot. 
The additional personality profiles provided with Roxxxy assume very unique sexual 
characteristics. For example, there is “Wild Wendy” which is very adventurous. There 
is also “Frigid Farah” that is very reserved and does not always like to engage in inti-
mate activities.”1 
 
 Other companies are producing Sexual Robots with various degrees of human re-
semblances and autonomy, while the market for these products increases, albeit still 
limited. Moreover, an online community is born (Su et al. 2019), where users are ex-
changing experiences and advise on the use of sexual dolls and robots. 
 
1.2 A Debated Topic 
The starting point of the scholar discussion about Sexual Robotics could be placed in 
Levy’s book “Love and Sex with Robots” (2009) where the author analyses the nature 
of human-human sexual interactions in comparison with human-robot sexual interac-
tions. His conclusions are enthusiastic about the introduction of Sexual Robots. After 
that, the interest for Sexual Robotics spread out in the scientific literature. Scholars are 
mainly divided between critics and supporters. The main concerns are about the possi-
bility to rape SRs (Strikwerda 2015), the commercialization of children SRs (Maras 
2017), the rights of SRs (Gunkel 2015), their moral status (Bendel 2016). Currently, 
there is a growing debate about Sexual Robots in the scientific community. 
Most of the discussion focuses on deciding whether robots should have "rights" and 
which are the acceptable behaviors to perform on them (Richardson 2016a). Two posi-
tion are the most supported in this discussion: the first argues that robots, since they 
have a certain degree of intelligence, must be guaranteed certain rights and a moral 
status (Bendel 2016). Others argue that they should be treated as objects (Levy 2009), 
because their ability to mimic intelligent behaviors doesn’t make them subjects. 
More in general, the discussion is divided between enthusiasts and detractors of Sex-
ual Robots. The former argue that rape and violence will decrease (Devlin 2015), sexual 
satisfaction of users will increase (Levy & Loebner 2007), it will contribute to the re-
duction of prostitution (Levy 2012). The latter argue that they will contribute to increase 
 
1 Some deny Roxxxy existence and claim that is a hoax. For the sake of this discussion, we 
believe that is not a crucial aspect the actual commercialization of such an artefact, but the 
fact that is an affordable technology for today’s state of art. 
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the violence (Sparrow 2017) and that they will reproduce the existing gender disparities 
(Cox-George and Bewley 2018). 
Most scholars agree that the predictable spread of Sexual Robotics on the market 
must happen within a regulative framework in order to avoid unacceptable conse-
quences of this technology, as child sex robots (Maras 2017), the worsening of human 
relational abilities (Turkle et al. 2006), the reproduction and amplification of gender 
disparities (Cox-George and Bewley 2018). 
 
1.3 The Exceptionality of Social Robots 
The one of Sexual Robots is only a specific case of the growing awareness about the 
disruptive impact of Social Robotics in our society, the multiple and probably still un-
thinkable uses (and misuses) of autonomous and interactive robots. 
  Both academia and the civil society largely agree that Social Robots won’t simply 
be other objects in our houses because of their degree of autonomy, adaptivity and re-
lationality (Breazeal 2004). Interactions with robots will supposedly strongly resemble 
the ones with humans and the “social” nature of these robots will, in any case, produce 
a deep impact on how we experience our intersubjective interactions. This difference 
between Social Robots (or interactive AIs) and non-interactive technological objects 
requires a specific theoretical effort (considering the peculiarity of Social Robots) in 
order to prevent negative consequences and enhance positive outcomes.  
Then, a specific theoretical framework for a regulation of Social robots is needed 
(Sharkey & Sharkey 2010), since they are a very peculiar type of objects: autonomous, 
interactive and social-oriented. 
This theoretical framework should: 
1. Explain if and on what basis Social Robots and interactive AIs differs from 
“classical” object (ontologically, socially, relationally, morally). 
2. Explain what the consequences of this exceptionality are on different levels: 
moral, legal, social, regulative (etc.). 
3. Describe the possible undesirable effects on human sociality and how to prevent 
them. 
Most of the current literature about the consequences of robots’ autonomy deals with 
the problem of moral status, often declined in the terms of “robots rights” (Gunkel 
2018).  
The problem of moral status can be summarized with the question “should robots be 
considered as morally relevant, both passively and actively? Should we give moral con-
sideration to actions performed by and on robots?” 
Obviously, the question arises because we are today facing massive advances in the 
field of robotics and AI and more and more machines are able to autonomously act, 
evaluating the context in where they are and choosing the best thing to do.  
In philosophical terms, it is the first time that a technological human-made object is 
reaching (or at least trying to achieve) a sort of autonomous agency (Broadbent 2017). 
So, the problem is declined both in the passive and active moral relevance of autono-
mous machines: what machines (should and should not) do and what we (should and 
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should not) do on machines. As said, most part of the current literature on the moral 
implications of robots and AIs passes through the concept of “rights”: many scholars 
are asking for giving robotics “rights” (Sharkey 2008) in order to institutionalize robots’ 
relevance to morality. Therefore, most of the discussion is about what rights should we 
grant to robots and on what basis.   
Multiple and different answer have been given to these two questions, deeply inter-
connected between each other. In most of the cases the claim is that we grant rights not 
only to humans but also to non-human beings as animals and abstract beings as institu-
tions, groups etc. (Gunkel 2018).  Hence, rights are differently distributed among dif-
ferent type of recipients, each of them possessing a certain degree of agency. Since 
autonomous robots have (or can mimic?) a certain degree of agency, then we should 
grant certain rights (Tavani 2018). Therefore, a spreading literature tries to establish 
under what conditions robots are worth of moral consideration and what rights must be 
granted to them. In our opinion, there are two very problematic aspects of thinking the 
moral problem in terms of rights to robots. First, the hard-to-support ontological as-
sumption that today’s robots genuinely have a certain degree of agency. Moreover, it is 
hard to state on which universal criteria we should rely to grant certain rights to robots 
with certain ontological properties. We could claim that the qualifying property for 
rights is self-awareness, or the ability to suffer pain, or intentionality. All of these op-
tions make sense (and are broadly supported), still there is no agreement on which is 
predominant, or the degree of each to possess in order to be qualified. Anyway, without 
disregarding this valuable approach, we try to ground the regulative framework on an-
other approach that, in our opinion, could produce faster and broader consensus on a 
theoretical framework for Social Robots regulation  
 
2 Social-Relational Approach to a Regulation of Social Robotics 
and Sexual Robotics 
In this paper we propose a different theoretical approach partially based on the “social-
relational approach” proposed by Coeckelbergh (2010). 
We believe that the very relevant part of a debate on Social Robotics (and Sexual 
Robotics as a part of it) should focus on the consequences for human relationality and 
sociality, when addressing regulative issues. In fact, apart from possessing or not any 
ontological property, Social Robots surely differs from any other object for their hu-
man-likeness and relationality (Sparrow 2016). So, when addressing regulative ques-
tions on the introduction of Social Robots in our interactional context, we should focus 
on the most urgent issue, in our opinion: how will Social Robots shape human relational 
settings and the human social sphere?  
In order to give an answer, it is necessary to state what relational characteristics make 
Social Robots different from other type of objects, and why we should have a particular 
normative framework for them. 
In fact, the deontological approach provided an explanation on why we should reg-
ulate Social Robotics in an exceptional way and why we should not consider them as 
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simple objects, namely stating that robots should be guaranteed with rights on the basis 
of their peculiar ontological properties.  
Instead, from a social-relational approach, we claim that Social Robots are a type of 
object that deeply reconfigure the user’s socio-relational setting because of: 
1. Their high degree of verbal, nonverbal and even emotional interactivity and their 
human resemblance (Sharkey 2008), producing interactional patterns very similar to 
the human-human interactions ones (Kramer et al. 2011). 
2. Their unlimited disposability to user needs and desires. In fact, unlike humans, 
robots never get bored of interacting and are totally at the user disposal (Turkle 2006) 
   What matters for a social-relational approach is that a certain interactional object 
will supposedly produce a significant change on human sociality.   
The concerns about the effect of relational technologies on human intersubjectivity 
is common between scholars debating on regulation of SRs, but few attempts to sys-
tematizing this approach have been made. 
Maras and Shapiro (2017) suggest that child sex robots could contribute to enhance 
the pedophile phantasies in subjects at risk. Richardson (2016c) states that Sexual Ro-
bots contributes on a distorted consideration of humans’ bodies as “consumable goods”. 
Turkle (2006) warns that always-at-disposal Social Robots could be preferred to human 
companions in the future. Even Levy (2009), in one of his papers, is concerned about 
the possible transfer of degrading behaviors from robots to humans. Nearly every 
scholar addressing regulatory issues is concerned, at least in part, with the fact that 
introducing interactive robots in our interactional space could lead to significant 
changes in our human-human interactions.  
Mark Coeckelbergh (2010) proposes, in opposition to theories of object’s morality 
(e.g. deontology) or subject’s morality (e.g. virtue ethics) a social-relational theory, 
which we accept as the ground for our discussion. The main conclusions of his approach 
are: 
- We should care about how robots appear to users, not about the ontological 
properties. 
- We should intend the relation between users and Social Robots as socially 
(and culturally, historically etc.) contextualized, when dealing with regulative 
and moral questions. 
- If, on one side, the relation between the subject and the interactional object is 
shaped by the social context, the intersubjective results of this relation will in 
turn shape the social sphere. 
Within Coeckelbergh’s social-relational approach, we want to provide a conceptual 
framework of the reason why (and how, to what extent) interacting with a social robot 
brings significant changes in human-human interactions.  
We will take in consideration the specific case of Sexual Robots, a subset of Social 
Robots. In fact, we believe that they are an interesting case study to clearly analyze the 
intersubjective implications of interacting robots. The attempt to extend our conclusion 
about Sexual Robots to Social Robots in general, will be matter of forthcoming works. 
In the next section we ground a psychoanalytical framework for Sexual Robot implica-
tions in users psychological setting. Afterwards we propose the concept of “Subjective 
Reference” as a relevant mechanism producing the intersubjective issues of Sexual 
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Robots. Then, we suggest our conceptualization of this mechanism as a possible key-
element in order to produce an effective regulative framework for Sexual Robots and 
Social Robots in general. 
 
2.1 Sexual Robots and Their Limitless Availability 
The socio-relational approach to sexual robotics allows us to develop important con-
siderations on how the "relationship" with these objects will affect both the people who 
directly interact with them and the society in general.  
First, we contextualize this approach within a psychological theoretical framework.  
One of the fundamental concepts of the psychodynamic approach is the conflict be-
tween the pleasure principle and the reality one. The first, which characterizes particu-
larly early childhood, implicates that the subject requires unlimited satisfaction of his 
needs and desires, regardless of the limitations that the outside world inevitably poses. 
The second, that evolve during the development, allows the subject to tolerate frustra-
tion, thus satisfying his own wishes to the extent that it is possible, given the limitations 
of external world. One of the fundamental consequences of the transition from pleasure 
principle to that of reality, is the possibility of perceiving and tolerating the other sub-
jects as autonomous (Winnicott 1990), endowed with the same rights as the subject 
her/himself, despite this inevitably limits the satisfaction of his wills (Nicolò 2003). 
This means that only the acceptance of the reality principle allows individuals to actu-
ally establish a relationship with another subject, taking into account her/his needs and 
rights, empathizing for her/him, considering her/him as a subject (Baron-Cohen 2011).  
Within this concept, the choice to use a sexual robot to satisfy sexual needs makes 
interesting questions arise. Indeed, we can imply that the choice of using a machine 
rather than relating to a human, is due to an issue in this area of the personality, since 
the interactions with a machine requires no compromises with the reality principle. 
Then, doubts arise on how much sexual robot users have reached the following abilities, 
typical of the health subject: 
- Accepting that the satisfaction of desire is not unlimited and tolerating the re-
sulting frustration. 
- Being in relationship with another person, perceived as a subject with rights 
and needs to be respected. 
Conversely, replacing humans with machines allows to: 
- Be certain that no limitations on the satisfaction of desire will take place. 
- Avoid confrontation with another subject that can advance needs and provide 
frustration. 
This choice can therefore be considered a regressive movement to a psychological 
setting in which one demands everything and immediately, as in the primary process 
(Ogden 1989). This mechanism of regression is true for every kind of masturbatory 
practices, that we define as every practice where only one subject is supposed to have 
agency and be able to manifest needs and wills.  
Moreover, some scholars compared interactions with SRs to ones with sexual work-
ers. As far as prostitution is concerned, it is necessary to underline that despite the sex 
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worker is paid, thus can become equal to an object at the phantasmatic level for the 
user, she always remains a subject. The sex worker does not lose her inalienable rights 
and she sets specific rules that must be respected. Moreover, the fact that sexual work 
is paid, imply a negotiation between to subjects. Furthermore, it is in any case a rela-
tional act involving a risk of frustration. For example, the subject may fear a criticism 
of his sexual performance, though not expressed by the sexual worker. Therefore, the 
relationship with a sex worker remains a relational act, with all the problems that this 
can cause, although deprived of some characteristics of intersubjective interactions. In 
the case of Sexual Robots, user faces an interactive object, mimicking a subject, provid-
ing unlimited fulfilment of desire. 
Therefore, we claim that the use of sexual robots differs from masturbation and pros-
titution for one prominent reason. In the masturbation, even with the use of particular 
objects, the subject is actually alone. In interacting with sexual workers the subject is, 
as we said, still in a real relational act. 
The sexual robot stands in a middle way, it is actually a machine, so the user is alone 
and he is not relating, however a relationship is simulated, not only through the sexual 
act but also through a series of complementary actions like talking, looking at each-
other, approaching in a “human” way (Richardson 2016c).  
The sexual robot in fact, does not represent just one part of the human body, such as, 
for example, a vibrator. Rather it depicts the whole human body and it also tries to 
simulate the abilities that are proper to human, like linguistic interactions. It implies 
that if with another masturbatory object only a sexual act is simulated, Sexual Robots 
reproduce a whole human relationship, not just at its sexual level. 
The sexual robot is then an object that is "subjectivized" where user can project a 
simulated relational satisfaction of his wills and needs (Richardson 2016b). What con-
sequences can this feature have on the user of a sexual robot?  
Of course, the differences between a masturbatory act and a relational one fade and 
this involves multiple consequences. As the object becomes "subjectivized", it is pos-
sible that, conversely, human subjects become "objectified". It is therefore possible that 
a sexual robot user will reproduce, in human-human interactions, some behavior which, 
if acceptable with a robot, will be unacceptable in a human interaction.  
This second implication of human-robot interactions:  
1) Directly derives from the nature of human-robot interactions, namely the limit-
less availability of robots and its “subjectification”. 
2) Brings many consequences in human-human interactions, since the interactional 
setting in behaving with robots could be transferred on relations with humans. 
3) Deeply impact social and relational sphere of humanity and it is highly relevant 
for a social-relational regulative framework. 
 
Then, we explain the shift of the relational setting from human-robot interactions to 
human-human interactions introducing the concept of “subjective reference” 
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2.2 The Concept of “Subjective Reference” and its Relevance for the 
Regulative Approach 
Sexual Robots producers want them as realistic as possible, to remove any noticeable 
difference between humans and robots. Today, commercialized SRs reproduce mostly 
women (Sparrow 2017). They must appear and behave like real humans because users 
are searching for a substitute of human-human sexual interactions and will supposedly 
prefer the most similar one (Levy 2009). But, if the robot is chosen largely (or 
uniquely?) for its similarity to humans, then it is not sexually relevant in itself but in 
place of something else, namely the thing it tries to mimic and resemble. 
In other words, we claim that (except from a minimum part of users fetishizing the 
very fact that is a machine) users are not enjoying a sexual intercourse with a SR be-
cause robots are objects. Users will enjoy it because the object looks like a human sub-
ject (objectified and fully under user control). 
Therefore, when the user sexually interacts with an SR, his/her sexual phantasies are 
not focused on the robot itself, but on the human partner which the robot is embodying 
and mimicking for user’s pleasure. The SR operates as a reference (a representant) that 
enables sexual phantasies (actually directed to a human subject) to be realized on a 
substitutive object. The human subject is physically absent but is symbolically the real 
target of all the actions the user will accomplish on SR’s body.  
In this sense, we claim that a SR is “Subjective Reference”: a constant reference to 
a human subject, a “subjectified” object. We claim that, for the user experience, every 
action performed upon a Sexual Robot is implicitly directed toward a human subject, 
including obviously degrading and violent practices.  
We believe that this shifting mechanism could severely impact on user sociality and 
behaviors acceptability. The SRs unlimited availability to user's needs and phantasies 
could normalize, in the user experience, the expectation of a full and unnegotiated sat-
isfaction of his sexual wills also in human-human interactions (Richardson 2016c).  
In addition, we should consider that the most probable users of SRs are subjects with 
poor or no sexual experiences or subjects with peculiar sexual desires, hard to express 
in human-human interactions (Cox-George et al. 2018). Most of these unacceptable (or 
hardly sharable) phantasies in human-human sexual interactions are those violent and 
degrading. If we allow users - mainly male since SRs are mainly gynoid - to freely 
express these phantasies on SRs, this could severely modify users’ sexual expectations 
and behaviors acceptability, normalizing aggressive and degrading approaches to sex-
uality. In fact, since actions performed on SRs are phantasmatically transferred on a 
human subject, so it will be the presumption of an unlimited availability to any sexual 
behavior. 
Summarizing, we support that: 
1) Sexual Robots are sexually relevant only (or for the most part) for their similarity 
with humans. 
2) Every sexual action performed on robots is symbolically referring to a represented 
human subject; we call this mechanism “subjective reference”. 
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3) Since robots allow any form of sexual behavior to be performed on them, includ-
ing violent and degrading, this expectation could (and probably will) be transferred in 
human-human sexual interactions.  
In this paper we do not analyze the specific social and relational implications of 
Sexual Robotics under the concept of subjective reference. Further work will link this 
concept with a possible increase of sexism in the social sphere and with a reduction of 
the social perception of rape severity.  
We propose that of “subjective reference” as a conceptual tool useful to: 
1) Analyze and forecast possible consequences of Social Robots commercialization 
2) Produce design strategies to be implemented in robots to avoid (or reduce) users 
misuse of Social Robots. 
3) Ground a regulative framework of Social Robotics, dealing with the severe im-
plications for sociality and relationality. 
In fact, a precise theorization of why and how Sexual Robots - and Social Robots in 
general – will impact human sociality and relationality allow us to foresee and prevent 
future negative implications of specific traits of Sexual Robots’ behavior.  
A regulative framework based (or directly involving) the concept of “subjective ref-
erence” takes in strong consideration not the action performed on the robot, valuing its 
rightness or wrongness in itself. This approach considers primarily if and how this ac-
tion could impact on human-human relations: we want to assess in which measure the 
user relational setting will be modified by the HR interaction. The reason why this 
modification could occur is explained by the concept of Subjective Reference: interac-
tions with robots (and a good example are Sexual Robots) are not meaningful in them-
selves for the user, but because they enable a shifting mechanism toward a human sub-
ject. This means that a regulative framework should limit the unacceptable actions on 
robots that will strongly refer to a human and, therefore, modify user attitude to rela-
tionality in general.  
Surely, we find a difficulty in implementing such a theoretical framework: we need 
a threshold stating a limit to actions performable on robots. This must rely on a precise 
description of interactional shift between human-robot interactions and human-human 
ones. We are working on this objective on our next work, in which we will apply the 
interactionist theory of relationship, derived from Palo Alto school. 
Then, we will be able to implement design strategies able to reduce (or even elimi-
nate) the risk of a severe worsening of users’ relational abilities and behavior accepta-
bility, by precisely understanding how and why a H-R interactional setting may be 
transferred to H-H interactions.   
 
3 Conclusions 
In this paper we claimed the greater effectiveness of a social-relational approach over 
a deontological one. We underlined the limits of deontologies, namely the heavy onto-
logical assumptions that these approaches need.  
10 
We agreed with a social-relational approach that, in our opinion, eases the grounding 
of a shared theoretical approach in order to produce a regulative framework and forecast 
Sexual Robots issues. We proposed, under a psychological approach, a conceptualiza-
tion of the mechanism enabling human-robot interactions to modify human sociality 
and relationality: the concept of “subjective reference”. We supported that the limitless 
availability of Sexual Robots will result in an identical expectation in the human-human 
sexual interactions. Finally, we discussed the importance of this conceptualization for 
future regulative approaches.  
In this paper we didn’t apply to specific cases the concept of subjective reference, 
this will be developed in next works. However, we believe the reader may easily guess 
the possible implications of this conceptualization. For instance, the possibility to rape 
an interacting robot - able to mimic a sexual appreciation of this violent behavior - 
could have severe consequences for men’s respect of women sexual consent. The habit 
of behave violently may normalize this kind of acts and, slowly, change social norms.  
We choose Sexual Robotics to present this issue because it is far more visible than 
in any other case the risk we are facing with the absence of a regulation. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the same mechanism occurs in any interactions with Social Robots, 
given that the machine has good abilities in mimicking humans. With Sexual Robots 
we believe that is far simpler that the shift occurs because of the peculiarity of sexual 
impulse.  
Next works will deal with specific cases in which the mechanism of subjective ref-
erence occurs in order to refine the concept and show its applicability.  
The desired goal is to come to a shared theoretical approach useful for a normative 
and regulative framework on Social Robots. 
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